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Allan E. Gotlieb *
I. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritoriality, or "ET" as it is known in the trade, has long
been a controversial subject in international law. In recent years, sev-
eral dramatic examples of its application have raised its profile consid-
erably. Perhaps the most glamorous treatment of extraterritoriality is
E.T,1 the recent film about the dilemmas an unusual creature faces
when he finds himself trapped in a foreign jurisdiction.
This paper focuses on the Canadian perspective on ET. While it
may not have quite the pace of Steven Spielberg's film, for many of us
involved in this issue, the argument contains more than enough inter-
national drama to satisfy our desire for spectacle.
II. DEFINITIONS AND CONTEXT
In strictly legal terms, extraterritoriality may be defined simply as
the application of domestic law to foreign conduct. It is an extension of
* Canadian Ambassador to the United States. This paper was first given as an address to the
International Law Association on November 12, 1982.
1 E.T: The Extraterrestrial, directed by Steven Spielberg, was released in the summer of
1982. An extremely popular motion picture, E. T earned $86.9 million in its first 25 days in the
theaters. See TIME, July 19, 1982, at 62.
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jurisdiction.2 This is not, however, always objectionable. For instance,
most states, including Canada, are prepared under certain circum-
stances to apply their criminal law to their nationals abroad or even to
foreigners abroad.3 International law accepts this kind of extraterrito-
riality-for example in hijacking cases.4
But in other cases, extraterritoriality raises serious problems; the
extension of jurisdiction appears unwarranted and unjustifiable. Once
again considered in strictly legal terms, the underlying issue concerns
the appropriate reach of state jurisdiction.
Although we define extraterritoriality in legal terms, it would be
misleading to limit its discussion solely to terms of legal discourse. In
fact, some may argue that at the point where extraterritoriality becomes
unwarranted, it steps beyond legal questions and enters the area of eco-
nomic and political discourse. That is, extraterritoriality is also a polit-
ical and economic issue. Before proceeding with a discussion of
extraterritoriality itself, we should locate the issue within the broader
political and economic context.
Let us begin with the economic context. The term "economic in-
terdependence," which describes the complex patterns of international
economic ties that bind countries together and make them mutually
dependent, is becoming increasingly familiar. It is a fact of modem life
by which we are shaping our national and international institutions.
During times of economic prosperity, interdependence connotes the ex-
2 See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 6 (1967):
Extraterritoriality has been defined as a term used to describe the act by which a state extends
its jurisdiction beyond its own boundaries into the territory of another state, and exercises it
over its nationals who, for the time being, may, be sojourning in the territory of the other
state.
3 See, e.g., Section 5(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code which provides that "[s]ubject to this
Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, no person shall be convicted in Canada for an
offence committed outside of Canada." MARTr's ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE 16 (1982). Section
6(1), however, provides that acts that would otherwise be indictable offenses if committed in Ca-
nada are, if committed on Canadian registered aircraft outside Canada or on any aircraft whose
flight terminates in Canada, "deemed" to be committed in Canada. Id at 16-17. Similarly, Sec-
tion 423(4) of the Code provides that everyone who, while outside Canada, conspires to effect an
unlawful purpose in Canada and certain other illegal acts is deemed to have conspired in Canada.
Id at 383.
4 In United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's convictions of four defendants for violating the
Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1976). The defendants, whose purpose was to
promote Croatia's independence from Yugoslavia, had hijacked a United States domestic flight to
a forced landing in Paris, following a refueling stopover in Montreal. The special aircraft jurisdic-
tion of the United States under 49 U.S.C. § 1472 was explained by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980), where it was
said that federal law applied to American and other aircraft en route from an airport in the United
States or en route from a foreign country directly to an airport in the United States.
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citement of expanding international trade and investment relations. It
describes international transfers of technology and comparative advan-
tage that account for much of the economic growth of the last few
decades.
But interdependence, or mutual dependence, carries with it the
risk of mutual vulnerability. The more inextricable the links among
nations, the more vulnerable each becomes to the actions of others.
During hard economic times these vulnerabilities generate deep frus-
trations with the limits imposed by the international system on individ-
ual nations. There is a feeling that individual nations are losing control
of their economic destinies. For example, efforts by one country to use
economic reflation to attack its unemployment problem have an almost
immediate impact on that country's international competitive position
and the value of its currency in international exchange markets. We
are becoming familiar, if unhappily so, with the international con-
straints on national action.
At the same time, interdependence leads to a more specialized
form of vulnerability, that which develops when the major economic
actors of our time, the multinational enterprises, are used as instru-
ments through which one state seeks to control activities in another
state. To a considerable extent, the multinational corporation has been
the engine of international economic activity, the economic actor
whose activities so regularly cross national boundaries that it often
blurs those very boundaries.5 A multinational corporation makes its
decisions-be they financial, research and development, marketing, or
production-based on its global operations rather than on its activities
within one country alone, even when the country is its home, or
headquarters.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the multinational corpora-
tion has come to be regarded by some as having the capacity to operate
outside the reach of any one nation's jurisdiction. From the point of
view of sovereign governments, this presumed capacity becomes a criti-
cal problem when the global reach is used as a means of escaping or
circumventing the policies of particular nations. It is in reaction to
such evasions-or at least the possibility of evasion--that some coun-
tries feel tempted to extend the extraterritorial reach of their national
jurisdictions, particularly those that see their national policies frus-
trated by multinational corporations. They feel compelled to assert
their jurisdiction over the entire range of economic activities by
5 R. VERNON, SovEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971).
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multinationals.6
The political consequences of these urges to exercise extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction are obvious. Each nation has a highly developed no-
tion of its sovereign responsibilities and of its right to exercise sovereign
jurisdiction over activities within its borders. Thus, unwarranted extra-
territorial actions by one country appear as intrusions into another's
domestic affairs and as a challenge going to the heart of its notion of
sovereignty.
Most countries voice well-articulated points of political and legal
principle in objection to such intrusions. Of course, the conflict be-
tween national jurisdictions becomes most heated when the countries
involved hold different political or strategic views.7 The recent conflict
over United States oil and gas export sanctions provides a striking
example.
It is clear that the situation involved more than simply legal princi-
ples. The United States' views on how trade and economic relations
with the Soviet Union should be conducted are at some variance with
6 For example, in the case In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1979), the United States district court ordered multinational corporate defendants to produce doc-
uments located abroad. The court's order came in spite of objections from certain countries in
which the documents were situated. Of the five objecting countries which submitted amicus cu-
riae briefs, Canada was most vehement in its opposition, urging the court to "defer to the critical
importance which Canada attaches to its national policies and regulations." Id at 1149. More-
over, the court noted that Canada had also "sent numerous diplomatic notes to the United States
State Department in which it has expressed a firm position that any disclosure of documents
covered in its regulations would be inimical to its national interests." Id at 1155. Nevertheless,
the court refused to comply with Canada's requests, and ordered production of the documents.
7 Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 1, 1982, at 6, col. 1:
The problem with extraterritoriality, however, is that the cases where push actually does
come to shove are really only the tip of the iceberg. A sovereign state can coerce a company
on its soil into following through on a firm export order, but what of deals that are not so
firm? . . . The murky iceberg below the visible tip can be melted only by an international
code which would reign in the extraterritorial application of domestic law.
But that won't be a realistic possibility as long as the United States cannot reconcile its
foreign and trade policies with those of its Western allies.
8 On Dec. 29, 1981, the United States introduced sanctions prohibiting the export of U.S.-
origin oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union, even if the equipment and
technology were already outside the United States. On June 18, 1982, the sanctions were extended
to prohibit the export of items manufactured outside the United States by subsidiaries of U.S.
companies or licensees of U.S.-origin technology. The sanctions were lifted on Nov. 13, 1982 after
a period of negotiation between the United States and the other major Western industrialized
nations, all of which had objected to the extraterritorial reach of the measures. In Canada, an
investigation was commenced under the Canadian Anti-Combines Act to determine whether there
were grounds for referring for review by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission the actions
of certain companies which had failed to bid on contracts related to the pipeline. The investiga-
tion was terminated when the sanctions were lifted.
Extraterritoriality
5:449(1983)
those of its allies.9 One should not be shocked, or even dismayed, to
discover that the Western allies hold different views on critical interna-
tional issues. We are, after all, an alliance of free countries. Differ-
ences in approach reflect the fact that different countries pursue
different national interests. While such differences are healthy, how-
ever, they become a real problem when one nation seeks to overcome
them by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the activities of a
foreign-based subsidiary of a domestically-based multinational
corporation.
The issue of political differences between countries, however,
should not obscure the legal principles involved here. Even given no
fundamental political differences between countries, extraterritoriality
may still create serious international, legal, political and economic ten-
sions. For example, United States efforts to freeze Iranian financial
assets in the United Kingdom and in other foreign jurisdictions created
serious legal problems. Those problems arose despite the widely-
shared political perceptions of the hostage crisis' ° about which the al-
lies agreed.
At this point it is useful to expand somewhat the "simple" defini-
tion of extraterritoriality suggested earlier. When we consider the eco-
nomic and political factors along with the legal ones, we see that the
real issue involves efforts by one country to extend the reach of its laws
to persons located within another sovereign jurisdiction. More particu-
larly, one country intends its extraterritorial reach to force persons lo-
cated outside its boundaries to behave in ways contrary to the laws and
policies of the country in which they are located.
III. UNITED STATES' EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
Against this background, certain United States policies and prac-
tices raise serious questions about the correct scope of the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The government does not necessarily have
motives less "noble" than those of its allies. Rather, certain legal prin-
ciples at work in the United States diverge sharply from widely held
standards of international opinion.
9 See European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade With the
USSR, 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982).
10 See McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law, 2 Nw. J. INr'L LAW & Bus. 384 (1980).
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A. Nationality Principle Justification
The international legal issue on which there is the clearest differ-
ence of view between the United States and its allies involves the con-
cept of corporate nationality. On a number of occasions, the United
States has invoked the "nationality principle" as the legal basis for ex-
tending its jurisdiction extraterritorially." The nationality principle
provides that in certain circumstances a state may regulate the conduct
of its nationals abroad; that is generally accepted. 2 But in our modem
world of artificial legal persons, the nationality principle by itself fails
to resolve many important questions. For example, what is the nation-
ality of the foreign subsidiary of a multinational corporation? May a
country regulate the foreign subsidiary of a domestic company when
that subsidiary has its own nationality elsewhere? Indeed, not only the
nationality of a company, but even the nationality of a product seems
to pose questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction if the country in which
it is produced is different from the country in which the technology
employed was developed. For example, may a country regulate the
sale of a product that includes material or technology originating there
when the product was fabricated abroad? When United States legal
advisors have answered such questions, they have considerably de-
parted from the general international consensus. 3
It is the difference of interpretation of the nationality principle that
creates such anxiety abroad over United States legislation such as the
Trading with the Enemy Act,'4 the Foreign Assets Control Regula-
tions,15 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 6 the Ex-
port Administration Act' 7 and the Export Administration
11 Statement of John Stevenson, Legal Adviser of Department of State, Before the Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association in Halifax on September 2, 1970, reprinted in "Extrater-
ritoriality" in Canadian-U.S. Relations, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 12, 1970, at 427.
12 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).
13 They may have also departed from the consensus of United States legal opinion. For exam-
ple, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 27 com-
ment d (1965), dealing with the nationality of corporations, provides that while a state of the
nationality of the persons who own or control a foreign corporation may prescribe rules governing
conduct of such persons, "it does not have jurisdiction to prescribe rules directly applicable to the
corporation." For an important statement of international opinion, see European Communities:
Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade With the U.S.SR , 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982).
14 Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44, 40 Stat. 411 (1976).
15 Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1980).
16 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06, Pub. L. No. 95-223,
91 Stat. 1625 (1977).




Regulations."8 This legislation and bills regularly appearing in Con-
gress assert jurisdiction over foreign juridical entities carrying on busi-
ness on foreign territory merely because Americans own or control
them.
Such legislation asserts United States jurisdiction in a manner in-
consistent with and tending to undermine the sovereignty of other na-
tions. If foreign law follows foreign capital, if the flag follows the
national currency, if controls that conflict with the laws and policies of
a foreign country follow enterprises located there, then eventually na-
tional sovereignty itself can be at stake. Sovereignty here refers to the
right and ability of a national government to impose its own laws and
policies-that is, to govern-within its own national boundaries with-
out undue or unwarranted external interference.
Corporations are creatures of domestic law, and the logic of do-
mestic law supports the view that United States legislation cannot re-
peatedly invoke the nationality principle for jurisdiction with regard to
foreign corporations. Whatever the nationality of its shareholders or
managers, or the origin of the technology or materials it uses, a corpo-
ration has the nationality of the country where it is incorporated. In
the Barcelona Traction case, 19 the International Court of Justice upheld
this view by ruling that a corporation's place of incorporation, and not
the nationality of its shareholders, determines its nationality.
Furthermore, the embryonic system of international agreements
on investment and multinational corporations also supports that view.
The agreements clearly reflect the principle that host countries, not
home countries, ought to exercise jurisdiction over those subsidiaries of
multinational corporations that operate in their territory. For instance,
the 1976 OECD Declaration on International Investmentz° provides
that subsidiaries of multinational enterprises located in various coun-
tries are subject to the laws of those countries. It stresses that multina-
tional enterprises should operate in accordance with the established
general policy objectives of the host countries. 21 Nowhere does the
Declaration mention any such prerogatives for home countries.
Consequently, in legal terms this all means that it is contrary to
international legal principles for one state whose nationals enjoy some
ownership of, or managerial relationship to a foreign corporation to
18 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1983).
19 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 41-44.
20 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, art. II, § I (June 21, 1976).
21 [d
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seek to impress its national laws upon that foreign corporation. It is
even less justifiable for a state to use the nationality principle to justify
its efforts to control the third country trade of a foreign corporation.
B. Antitrust Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
A second United States practice which causes bilateral problems
with other countries is its definition of antitrust jurisdiction. Under the
civil proceedings provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act,22 United
States courts virtually automatically adjudicate private damage suits
against foreign corporations. In such cases the goal is not political, but
overwhelmingly determined by private economic considerations. The
problem derives from the fact that United States practice permits an
interpretation of the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction that is
too broad. According to the United States interpretation, the effects
doctrine permits events outside the United States to become actionable
within the United States if they affect its domestic or foreign com-
merce.23 This is an assertion of extraterritoriality which Canadians and
others find objectionable.
One example of such an assertion of extraterritoriality stemmed
from the uranium production decisions of the immediate post-war pe-
riod.24 Those decisions led to a uranium glut in the 1960s which af-
fected United States producers. They in turn convinced the United
States government to forbid the enrichment of imported uranium that
United States electric power utilities might have used in their genera-
tors.25 The practical effect of these measures was a United States em-
bargo on uranium imports. Plainly protectionist, the ban's effect on
Canadian and other countries' uranium industries was catastrophic.
26
It forced supplier countries to encourage action by their producers to
ensure orderly marketing outside the United States.27 Although the ex-
22 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (federal court has subject matter jurisdiction when alleged antitrust activ-
ity of one U.S. litigant results in harm to another U.S. litigant's business even if the acts take place
abroad); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (Sherman Act case could be maintained against foreign manufacturer even if that manufac-
turer committed no act outside its own country).
23 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1945); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
24 In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 281 (1977)
(quoting background paper issued by the Honorable Alastair Gillespie, the Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources for Canada).
25 Id




act price effect of this cooperation is debatable, one nuclear reactor
manufacturer in the United States which arranged long-term uranium
sales in connection with its reactor sales found that its fuel cost esti-
mates were out of line. It had entered into long-term contracts for the
sale of uranium to encourage reactor sales, but had failed to protect
itself through purchase contracts. When the international price of ura-
nium rose, the company was exposed.28 The corporation attempted to
transfer liability for this commercial miscalculation to the uranium
producers by arguing that their pricing practices were contrary to
United States antitrust law and by arguing that these practices were
subject to United States jurisdiction.
In this particularly complex context, the United States courts per-
mitted suits for damages against foreign uranium producers. 29 By al-
lowing the suits, the courts in effect said that if an action outside the
United States causes financial damage to a United States corporation
by causing the world price of uranium to rise, the Sherman Act permits
United States companies to seek redress. This holds true despite the
fact that the foreign suppliers acted without any intention of affecting
the United States market or its corporations; indeed, the very opposite
was the case. Although the specifics of the uranium cases probably lie
behind us, the United States legal reasoning in this and previous anti-
trust cases remains a matter of serious international concern.
IV. CANADA AND UNITED STATES EXTRATERRITORIALITY
For Canada, concerns over United States extraterritoriality are not
simply theoretical; the nature of our economy makes us especially vul-
nerable to such unwarranted exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. A
large part of our oil and gas sector, our mining sector and our manufac-
turing sector are controlled from abroad.30 These facts demonstrate
that Canada responds hospitably to foreign investment and continues
to believe in the many benefits to be gained from increased foreign
investment. But arguably, Canadians also find themselves in a better
position than anyone else to know the costs.
The Canadian government established the Foreign Investment
Review Agency (FIRA) to mitigate some of these costs and to try to
balance the demands of foreign capital with the demands of Canadians
28 In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 994 (10th
Cir. 1977).
29 See, e-g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
30 See FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, INDICATORS OF
FOREIGN CONTROL OF NON-FiNANCIAL INDUSTRIES BY PROVINCE 110-11 (1978).
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to participate fully in the development of their own national econ-
omy. 3' FIRA is a federal mechanism which screens new foreign invest-
ment proposals to ensure that they will confer significant benefits on
Canada. One of the primary objectives of discussions between FIRA
officials and foreign investors is to sensitize investors to both Canada's
capabilities and its aspirations. We also expect foreign investors to rec-
ognize Canadian sovereignty over economic activity within our
borders. 2
Although this latter point may appear self-evident, it must be rec-
ognized that the majority of the foreign investment in Canada comes
from the United States. As a result, United States views on extraterri-
toriality and on the limits of sovereignty are profoundly important to
Canadians. For example, the dispute over oil and gas sanctions indi-
rectly engaged Canadian interests. Also, Canadians have experienced
very real difficulties when Canadian subsidiaries of United States com-
panies have been forced by their corporate parents to forego trade op-
portunities with Cuba and China.3 This amounts to more than legal
wrangling for its own sake. It has jeopardized jobs and trading rela-
tionships. Canadians have been deeply upset by foreign controls
placed on Canadian-incorporated companies-especially when those
controls directly conflict with Canadian law and policy.
I suppose it is Canada's particular vulnerability, because of our
high level of foreign investment, which has caused other countries to
look to our experience for insight on how to deal with some of the costs
created by foreign, particularly United States, investment. In other
words, United States extraterritorial practices have seriously affected
the global economic and political system. Foreign investment and
transnational corporations play vital roles in global economic develop-
ment, and in general have been regarded as having a beneficial impact.
That view, however, may be changing. For example, the principle of
national treatment34 that the United States itself finds so important
may be undermined by the concern of other nations that multinational
corporations based in the United States not be permitted to act like
other national firms with regard to the laws and policies they follow.
The United States government has expressed genuine concern
31 Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. c. 46 (1973).
32 See P. HAYDEN, J. BURNS, I. SCHWARTz, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA: A GUIDE TO
THE LAW (1974).
33 J. Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14
McGILL L.J. 174 (1968).
34 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 61
Stat. A7, A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 204.
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for what it perceives to be increased control by foreign governments
over United States foreign investment. The Canadian government and
several other OECD member countries take the position that interna-
tional discussion of foreign investment controls is appropriate, but
should be carried out in a broader context-within a discussion of the
international roles of multinational corporations and their susceptibil-
ity to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Unless we, the governments of the
United States and other industrialized nations, deal with investment in
a broader context, we are unlikely to reach successfully the basic source
of some of these disputes.
With regard to extraterritoriality, a pattern of defensive legislation
has already begun to emerge. Part of that pattern is evidenced by for-
eign investment controls. And, several of the United States' most im-
portant trading partners, including Canada, have either considered or
enacted legislation expressly designed to prohibit persons that the
United States regards as subject to its extraterritorial jurisdiction from
obeying its orders and regulations.35 The emerging pattern of defen-
sive measures points to a need for more than ad hoc solutions or partial
accommodations. It is now necessary that we negotiate general rules to
which the United States will agree.
V. CONCLUSION
This is the broad controversy of extraterritoriality. It is extremely
difficult, and there are no hard and fast general answers. In our inter-
dependent world it is clear that a dogmatic and exclusively territorial
approach to sovereignty-one that completely separates national juris-
dictions-will not work. Some extraterritoriality is inevitable and,
sometimes, even desirable. But, it must be very limited. The interna-
tional flow of trade and investment requires appreciation of how the
legal and regulatory frameworks of different nations differ. In the final
analysis, we must know where one jurisdiction ends and another be-
gins; we must respect the lines of demarcation, as ill-defined as they
may be.
The problem will not resolve itself. Transnational regulation of
business activity is needed. And, because transnational business activ-
ity is growing in today's world, the need for regulation is growing as
well. How can we establish a sensible regulatory regime for this pur-
pose? There is no magic formula. If, for one reason or another, the
35 On July 11, 1980, Bill C-41, the Foreign Proceedings and Judgements Act was given first
reading in the House of Commons of Canada.
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differences of approach are intolerable, we must consult and negotiate
cooperatively instead of litigating and legislating unilaterally. If trans-
national controls are to be effective, if individuals and companies are
not to be placed in the impossible situation of receiving contradictory
orders from two jurisdictions, each with the power to punish for non-
compliance, then we must base transnational regulation on multilateral
understanding, not on unilateral action.
When there are true cases of concurrent and conflicting jurisdic-
tion, there is much to recommend a "balancing" or "reasonableness"
approach to jurisdictional problems. Identifying the factors to be
weighed, assigning weights to those factors, and choosing entities to
weigh the factors all are matters of importance. Fortunately, in light of
the draft revision of the United States Restatement of the Foreign Re-
lations Law, they are now receiving attention. While we welcome the
development of more sophisticated mechanisms to resolve conflicts of
public law, however, we must recognize that such tests may have little
relevance for corporate nationality problems. The view held almost
universally-except in the United States-finds that links of ownership
and control of a foreign juridical entity do not justify the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction over such an entity with respect to conduct
which neither occurs in nor very significantly affects the territory of the
legislating state. In short, there is no concurrent jurisdiction in law-
merely legally unfounded assertions of a conflict.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that owner-
ship and control create a minimal basis for exercising jurisdiction, what
would be the results of a "balancing" or "reasonableness" test in the
usual situation? I submit that evaluation of the relevant factors listed
in Section 403 of the draft revised Restatement36 suggests it would be
"unreasonable" for the United States to try to impose its trade policy
on foreign corporations which produce and market goods in accord-
ance with the laws and policies of the territorial sovereign from whose
laws they derive their existence.
We need established and accepted rules of the game on extraterri-
toriality. Fortunately, there is some hope for the future. Lots of good
positive work is being done. First, two meetings sponsored by the An-
glo-American Ditchley Foundation,37 the more recent in March 1982,
disclosed some common ground among American, European and Ca-
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
37 The Ditchley Foundation meetings at which the extraterritorial application of national law
was discussed were held at Ditchley Park, England, in Mar. 1980 and Mar. 1982.
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nadian lawyers, business executives, and government officials. The
agreement is sufficient to encourage our belief that, in the proper fo-
rum, we might agree upon enough basic principles to curb at least some
of the excesses of unilateralism. Secondly, the American Law Institute
is reformulating its principles on this subject. The Canadian authori-
ties hope the results will constitute a significant step away from uni-
lateralism and towards a regime based upon mutual accommodation.
But, we still need a good deal more work by international groups of
lawyers and policymakers.
A minimum of cooperative spirit and self-restraint might result in
clarified international rules on state jurisdiction by which to build a
basic framework for the regulation of transnational economic activity.
That would benefit us all.
